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MICHAEL REISMAN*

SHORT ARTICLES,
COMMENTS AND CASENOTES

The Teaching of International

Law in the Eightiest
I. International Law in the Law School Curriculum
Lawyers are trained to be specialists in community decisionmaking.
Those charged with their professional education try to equip their acolytes
with the conceptions, skills and ethical precepts that will enable them to
discharge their functions in a responsible fashion. Given the brevity of
the period of formal instruction-usually six 14-week periods distributed
over three years-there must be a certain competition for time and, inevitably, a tendency to characterize some courses as core or indispensable
and others as essentially optional or cosmetic, "boutique courses" as
they are now called.
International law is frequently relegated to the second category, in part
because of apparently rational calculations, in part because of the pressures of "consumer" groups such as Bar associations and committees of
examiners, in part because of outmoded jurisprudential conceptions which
operate at very deep levels of consciousness, and in part because of little
more than curricular inertia. That relegation is a mistake whose consequences can be measured in terms of a loss of professional competence
and capacity to serve clients and the community. Anyone teaching international law knows that our planet is increasingly interdependent and that
most of the social arrangements that we think of as quintessentially domestic in this country are inextricably interwoven with complex processes
in other countries and regions of the globe. Consider: our security system;
our political-economic system; the search to find and retain external mar*Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.
tA similar version of this article was delivered by the author to the Association of American Law Schools' "Workshop on Teaching International Law," held in Chicago, Illinois,
September 21, 1984.
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kets for our products; our dependence on the natural resources without
which an advanced industrial and science-based civilization cannot survive; our health system; our conceptions of fundamental morality and so
on.

Ii. International Law in an Integrated Global System
Integration in a global system means that even "domestic law" courses
can no longer be understood adequately-whether for descriptive or practical professional purposes-without an understanding of the organization
and dynamics of the international system. Constitutional law and, in particular, the relative powers of the different branches; emergency economic
powers as they relate to all the areas of commercial law, environmental
law and so on are all deeply influenced by and, in many ways, take account
of international events.
An integrated planetary communication system has now created a state
of global simultaneity for political and economic matters, to the point that
even practitioners in small cities often encounter mundane commercial
cases with "foreign" elements. The point bears emphasis. The penetration
of international systems into the domestic process has gone so far that
international law is no longer the prerogative of a small circle of lawyers
practicing in New York and Washington. It is a feature of professional
life to be reckoned with throughout the nation. Insofar as law schools
recognize a coordinate responsibility to educate future political leaders,
many of whom are recruited from the Bar, the need to equip students
with conceptions and tools for dealing with global legal processes is even
more apparent.
Professional education must take careful account of the problems
professionals encounter and the skills they will need. The practice of
international law, like the practice of all law, is far more than simply
researching and reporting black letter to a client. In the introduction to
the casebook Professor McDougal and I prepared,' we wrote:
The scholar as well as the lawyer advising a client can do no more than explain
what relevant decisions were made in the past and what relevant decisions are
likely, under different conditions, to be made in the future, to aid in the clarification of goals and then devise strategy tooled toward goal realization. We
are, thus, concerned with sensitizing the student to the performance of five
intellectual tasks which every decision specialist must discharge: the clarification of goals, the review of past decisions, the identification of conditioning
factors that accounted for those past decisions, the projection, by a variety of
means, of possible future courses of this decision, and finally the invention of
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techniques for intervening in a way to cause future decisions to promote the
2
public order interests of one's community or other clients.

But if the intellectual tasks of international law are the same as those
required in all other fields of legal endeavor, the context and structures
of the international system are radically different. This is a point that
lawyers not trained in international law frequently fail to appreciate.
III. Differences between Domestic and International Law

I have considerable sympathy for the dilemma of deans and chairmen
of curriculum committees. Obviously our schools cannot teach students
everything they will need in the course of their careers. Demand for time
in the six 14-week periods exceeds supply. Choices must be made. And
the fact is that some courses can be deleted from the compulsory and
even optional curriculum, not because they are unimportant but because
a competent lawyer can teach himself their elements in a short period. If
you have a case with an intellectual property component and you had not
done that course in law school back-when, you can probably teach yourself what you specifically need for your case. After all, lawyers are trained
to be students and quick learners. Even in courses we have taken, we
are expected constantly to update our knowledge as fields change, information is obsolesced, policies modulate and institutions are transformed.
But that process of self-education cannot be accomplished in international
law. It is worth exploring why.
A. DANGERS OF TRANSPOSING DOMESTIC EXPERIENCES

Once a student has a basic understanding of our domestic legal system,
he or she can move to other areas and learn them quickly because the
decision-structure in which they transpire, the methods of making and
applying law, and many of the basic policies of the law are the same or,
at least, cognate. Legislative sources-statutory or regulatory, federal or
state-will be the same. Agencies of application-federal or state courts,
administrative agencies at different levels and so on-will be the same.
The style of ratiocination will be the same. And most important, the
environing system of political power within which our legal system operates, that variable of power which is inevitably part of law but whose
salience we are often able to ignore or even deny, will be the same.
None of this applies when the student moves into the international legal
arena. Some of the road signs seem to be similar, but, on examination,
they prove to be what the French call "false friends." There is something
2. Id., at xviii, xix
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called an International Court and there is a General Assembly which might
be likened to an international parliament and there is a Secretary General
and a Security Council which might be likened to an Executive Branch.
But in most ways, these institutional designations are quite misleading.
Although the General Assembly produces a great deal of law-like material,
it actually makes law rarely. The lawmaking process in the international
system is much broader, more varied and for the most part non-institutional.
The International Court can be likened to an American court in name
only.
In the United States (though in relatively few of the other one hundred
sixty some territorial communities of the planet), there has been and is,
for the foreseeable future, a fairly stable congruence of power and authority; the formal institutions of government have adequate effective
power to sustain their indispensable decisions. Hence lawyers and citizens
can rely on statements of what the law is that emerge from legislatures
and courts and can count on courts and other agencies, in appropriate
circumstances, to enforce that law. In part, this institutional stability,
based on a congruence of legal authority and effective power, permits the
domestic lawyer to move rather rapidly into areas in which his formal
training is thin and to self-educate. But because of the radical differences
between the domestic and the international context, that sort of confident
lateral move is most perilous when someone without systematic training
rushes into international law. At one time or another, all of us have had
occasion to gasp at the sincere but truly bizarre efforts of such autodidacts.
The student encountering international law must understand that the
relatively tempered character of domestic politics in North America and
the western peninsula of Europe is unique and is a key factor accounting
for the broad range and remarkably efficient operation of American law.
In most other settings, and certainly in the international, politics operates
with its full savagery. Even teachers sometimes forget this. If one wants
to understand what authoritative decision does and what it can accomplish, it is imperative that student, teacher or any observer ground himself
in the global process of effective power. And it is imperative that he
appreciate that when power is not coordinated with law, it wreaks havoc
with law-and not vice versa.
One of the major problems in understanding international law and teaching it to beginners involves incorporating this discrepancy between formal
statements of law, on the one hand, and operative normative codes which
are discrepant from the formal code, on the other, into a coherent theory
which can enable the student or practitioner to perform the analytical and
predictive tasks of legal practice. A good deal of what is international law
on the books is not international law in practice and that includes, unVOL. 20, NO. 3
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fortunately, some of the most fundamental norms. Substantial parts of
the United Nations Charter were drafted at a time when there was a
fundamental consensus between the major powers of the globe. That
consensus dissolved and many of the procedures of the Charter which
had been designed in contemplation of it were suspended. But the Charter
continues to serve as a major symbol and statement of international goals.
B.

COPING WITH COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION

How does one convey this complexity and contradiction to students?
One must equip students with a theory which can account, on the one
hand, for the policy of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter and confirm
its importance and viability, yet acknowledge that it is neither an accurate
description or prediction of behavior nor of authoritative reaction to it.
One must encourage the student to proceed to develop a set of criteria
for making meaningful judgments about the unilateral use of force. In an
earlier study, 3 I used the words "myth system" and "operational code"
to try to capture this curious discrepancy:
A disengaged observer might call the norm system of the official picture the
myth system of the group. Parts of it provide the appropriate code of conduct
for most group members; for some, most of it is their normative guide. But
there are enough discrepancies between this myth system and the way things
are actually done by key official or effective actors to force the observer to
guidelines for
apply another name for the unofficial but nonetheless effective
4
behavior in those discrepant sectors: the operational code.

This discrepancy between authority and control and the extraordinary
gap between the international myth system and the actual operational
code combines with the lack or organizational structure to present the
teacher with a major intellectual and pedagogical problem.
Take only one example. One of the features of a decentralized system,
lacking institutional articulation, is that there is no formal and organized
way to terminate existing norms. You simply cannot repair to a legislature
and ask that a statute be terminated or to a court and ask that a precedent
be overruled. In decentralized systems, law is terminated, more often
than not, by unilateral claims expressed in or supported by behavior. Since
a number of actors continue to rely on the norm that is being terminated
this way, international law and politics are regularly marked by a conflation
of conflicting characterizations: one side will describe its behavior as a
good faith innovation, a claim to establish a new norm, while the other
side will characterize it as a manifest and intentional violation of law. In
3. M.
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a way, both sides are correct, for much depends on how you look at
things. Often, much will depend on who prevails. But the net result of
this unorganized system of terminating norms is a continuing uncertainty
about which norms are operative and an exacerbation of reciprocal suspicion and distrust. Think, in this regard, of United States testing over
the Pacific Ocean in the early 1950's or U.S. initiation of aerial surveillance.
Students, whose intellectual provenance is an organized and effective
national system, such as our own, must be made aware of the complexity
of legal change in a decentralized or ineffectively organized system and
the hazards involved in superficial characterizations of certain actions as
unlawful without regard to the larger dynamics of power and authority.
If something approximating the real picture is not conveyed, the student
emerges with a reassuringly rosy but wholly unrealistic conception of
what international law is and can do. Any advice he or she may give to
a client at a later stage would be inaccurate and highly irresponsible. And
that possibility should be a serious concern for us. But if a student slides
off, as is quite easy, into the cynical view that there is no international
law, that clubs are trumps, to borrow from Hobbes, and that all that counts
is power, he or she will be equally ineffective in predicting, advising, and
appraising.
At times, it is exceedingly difficult to evade the corrosive effect of
cynicism, especially when the issue is consensus on values and political
goals. Every community, including the international community, is marked
by sufficient homogeneity of demands and of conceptions of past and
future to warrant the attribution "community." But there is also enough
heterogeneity to require a system of law with effective sanctions to maintain group order. Heterogeneity and the conflict in various forms it imports
exist in even relatively stable and organized national communities. Students often lose sight of that fact. But the degree of heterogeneity in the
international system is particularly daunting. The world community is
composed of peoples scattered over some one hundred sixty territories,
with different cultures, classes, castes, language and dialect systems,
moralities and beliefs systems, dissimilar levels of economic development,
radically different conceptions of what has happened in the past and what
will happen in the future and, frequently, intense and often reciprocal
hatreds and distrusts rooted deeply in their very identities. In such a
"community" it is very difficult to find common symbols of authority and
it is frequently difficult to identify common values. There may be precious
little common ground between an Islamic fundamentalist in any country
from Morocco to Indonesia and the secular urbanized person in Amsterdam, Tokyo, Rome, Paris, London, New York or Chicago. In this dizzying
diversity, the international law teacher and practitioner must identify or
create institutional practices whose capacities to realize common interest
VOL. 20, NO. 3
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are sufficiently obvious to recommend them to the peoples who hold such
divergent viewpoints.
C. LEARNING TO CLARIFY COMMON INTERESTS

For the teacher, the challenge-I believe-is to make the student appreciate the fact that international law, like all law, is no more than a set
of artifacts created by human beings to realize perceived common interests. That forces the student to address the problem of identifying common
interests in the extremely heterogeneous community in which he operates,
for acknowledging that law is a tool requires one to find and make express
the purpose for which the tool is to be wielded. The resistance to this
type of inquiry may be great, for many students in the United States come
to international law with the casual assumption that law presupposes wide
and deep political consensus on most issues and hence that the proper
province of the lawyer is essentially a technical one.
When the requirement of clarification of goals in a modern, secular
conception of law is understood, issues like the international protection
of human rights or the core disagreement of our era-that of the restructuring of production and distribution as a way of facilitating the economic
and social development of the poorer states-can be put in an appropriate
and fruitful legal setting. The New International Economic Order (NIEO),
that set of claims by a large number of peoples of the world for a fundamental change in patterns of wealth production and distribution, cuts
across virtually every area of traditional international law, none of which
may henceforth be examined without considering it. All international legal
discussions of the resources of the planet must take account of it. But
NIEO cannot be meaningfully considered unless its proposals can be
tested by some conception of common interest, by which the student can
assess which proposed arrangements are likely to yield the greatest benefits for the peoples of the world. Without that, we are confined to sterile
ideological argument. There is, for example, no inherent value to a regime
over the resources of the deep seabed which is organized along pure free
market lines or as a type of TVA. In a particular context, the relative
value of one over the other can only be determined by projecting the
aggregate consequences of each and testing them in terms of the aggregate
shared interests of the international community (optimum production,
equitable distribution of direct and incidental benefits, rational conservation and so on), and finally seeing which yields more. That exercise
presupposes clarifying just what those shared or common interests are.
The sheer range of international law is as daunting as the complexity
of its individual parts. International law is usually taught as a general
course. This means that the general course must effectively cover the
SUMMER 1986
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entire spectrum of contemporary international law and must include the
basic constitutional law of the international system; the establishment of
states and the perquisites that are associated with it; the allocation of
different forms of inclusive and exclusive control over the various resources of the planet and the programs to protect the environment from
degrading uses; national elite control over people balanced by the attempt
to provide a measure of internationally prescribed and guaranteed human
rights for them; state responsibility and notions of tortious liability; the
regulation of the military instrument, of economic warfare, of propaganda,
of diplomacy and of treaties; the allocation of jurisdiction between competing states over people, events and things with regard to which different
states have either simultaneous or sequential control; and the attempt to
maintain stability and continuity when there are changes of government,
the so-called state or governmental succession problem. Each of these
areas is subject to the stresses of change; inherited policies must be examined for their present and future relevance, lest practices that no longer
serve common interests or are inimical to them continue because of nothing more than inertia.
Thus the international law teacher confronts a range of subject matter
which our colleagues in neighboring vineyards rarely encounter. Some
selectivity is necessary but there is little agreement among us as to which
matters may be left, as we say euphemistically, "for individual study."
The'late Richard Baxter once remarked to me that he wanted a teaching
book in international law in which substantial sections could simply be
assigned to the students for reading and study without discussion. I have
often wondered which sections he would have thought sufficiently straightforward to be taught in that economical fashion. In my experience, all of
it must somehow be explored if the understanding of basic principles and
problems is to be conveyed.
And yet all of this is the smallest part of the problem. The international
system we have inherited is in a process of decay, perhaps disintegration.
That is no discharge from professional responsibility for, whatever the
state of the system, legal tasks must still be performed in the service of
public and private clients. But intellectually, practically and emotionally,
periods of breakdown are particularly confusing to lawyers who are trained
to look to certain authoritative institutions for guidelines of appropriate
legal and ethical behavior. Unique intellectual challenges are thus posed
to teachers who are willing to address reality and try to equip students
with the special perspectives and skills that must be brought to bear in
these circumstances.
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IV. Conclusion
For students and lawyers who are impatient with uncertainty and ambiguity, international law is an irritating, frustrating, even impossible subject. An anodyne is available to those who retreat to a purely textual and
technical conception of the legal mission. For those who view law as a
means for enhancing the precarious minimum order our species has attained and accelerating the move toward a public order of human dignity,
the structural imperfections and inadequacies of the international legal
system present a massive problem and, sometimes, a challenge so great
that it can depress and paralyze creative response.
Make no mistake about it. International law is a woefully bad system;
it does not work well and when it does work, it produces and distributes
values in ways that should offend all but the morally defective. Yet it is
the only international legal system we have on a interdependent planet
where some system of international law is inescapable. If what we have
should fail, the consequences for many human beings on the planet will
be calamitous. In the meanwhile, whatever its quality, international law
limps along, penetrating national processes more and more. Hence students and practitioners, even those who do not contemplate international
practices, must understand and acquire skill in it. The international law
teacher must understand it in its imperfect totality and learn ways of
conveying it to students, so that they will be equipped to practice and
5
improve it.

5. Those interested in exploring the topic of teaching international law subjects might
consult the bibliography, Johnson-Champ, Selected Readings on Teaching International

Law, 18
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